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Abstract
Advancements in information technology is known
for enabling new business models and new market
mechanisms. Online crowdfunding is one such new
mechanism through which entrepreneurs can advertise
their potential products and attract investors from the
mass. In this study, we advance the existing theory
on online crowdfunding markets by recognizing that
online crowdfunding provides not only a venue of
fundraising to entrepreneurs but also a venue for them
to obtain demand information before production and
to signal their intention. We formulate a spatial
competition model between profit-driven entrepreneurs
and product-driven entrepreneurs and find that on
average profit-driven entrepreneurs earn higher profits,
but their advantage is constrained by the mechanism
of the crowdfunding campaign, and product-driven
entrepreneurs earn a significant fraction of the market.
Comparing to the Keep-it-all funding scheme we used
in the baseline model, the All-or-nothing scheme
is more favorable for product-driven entrepreneur,
under which the two type entrepreneurs earn equal
market shares. We further discuss model implications
for consumer satisfaction of the platform and find
that including more product-driven entrepreneurs, or
adopting All-or-nothing funding scheme improves the
overall quality of the platform, but the effects on design
popularity and consumer welfare are subtle.
Keywords: Crowdfunding; Entrepreneurs; Spatial
Competition; Signaling

1.

Introduction

Recent revolutionary development of information
technology creates a plethora of new opportunities
for entrepreneurs and has fundamentally changed the
business ecosystem. The emergence of new business
models, funding avenues and marketing strategies
facilitates the rising of heterogeneously motivated
entrepreneurs ([22]).
One such example is online crowdfunding platform.
The business model of crowdfunding, on the one hand,
makes it possible for entrepreneurs to access funds from
“the crowd” through websites, social media and mobile
apps etc. On the other hand, it provides a platform for
entrepreneurs to tell background stories that convey their
ideas and devotions about their products. This capability
enables the thriving of non-pecuniary entrepreneurs.
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A vast literature on entrepreneurship suggests
that entrepreneurs have non-pecuniary motivations and
conscientiousness is an essential personal trait to
entrepreneurs.
(See [15] and references therein.)
They value their preference on products and devote to
improving the quality of their ideal products ([21]).
For instance, Elon Musk describes his motivation of
being an entrepreneur: “My motivation for all my
companies has been to be involved in something that I
thought would have a significant impact on the world
([17]).” As addressed by the entrepreneurship literature,
entrepreneurs value both profit and other non-pecuniary
factors such as their own preferences on products. But
they differ in the extent that they value profits over
products.
Online
crowdfunding
helps
heterogeneous
entrepreneurs grow a successful business.
For
instance, the crowdfunding campaign of PAKT One–a
travel bag designed for the minimalism travelers–on
Indiegogo helps the founder build a brand that matched
their own taste and standard of quality ([11]). In
the meantime, online crowdfunding platforms aim to
enlarge or maintain a stable customer base, which
can help them generate sustainable profits or future
investments, since a stable customer base is one of the
core competency. Thus, it is important to understand
how a platform can improve consumer satisfaction in
order to maintain a stable customer base. In particular,
should the platforms include a larger fraction of
heterogeneous entrepreneurs?
Would competition
among heterogeneous entrepreneurs improve consumer
satisfaction? A first step to understand these questions
is to understand the strategic interaction among
entrepreneurs and then we can further understand
whether their strategic interactions affect the interest of
the platform.
To this end, we build a spatial competition
model where heterogeneously motivated entrepreneurs
compete for a fund in a crowdfunding campaign,
while consumers with heterogeneous preferences on
product designs locate on a line.
We suppose
that entrepreneurs have preferences on their ideal
products—they care about their ideal designs of the
product and have a quality pursue. They vary in how
much they value their ideal products over funding or
revenue, and thus we call entrepreneurs are of either
product-driven or profit-driven type. Entrepreneurs’
types are private information and drawn from a
publicly known distribution. The model allows us to
understand the effect of competition of heterogeneously
motivated entrepreneurs on their product choices, based
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on which we can further study the implications for
crowdfunding platforms. It’s worth noting that we
have no intention to separate profit and product as
entrepreneurs’ motivations. We only use the two types
to capture the heterogeneity of the extent to which
entrepreneurs value product features over funding or
revenue. Alternatively, this can be viewed as the case
where product-driven entrepreneurs incur lower cost in
making products which are of high quality or match their
ideal designs.
More specifically, our model focuses on competitive
product market, so that the entrepreneurs take market
price as given.
We find that, in equilibrium,
heterogeneous entrepreneurs tend to choose
(moderately) diversified designs of products, i.e.,
target the niche market, whereas in traditional markets
price-taking entrepreneurs choose the same products
catering towards the median, i.e, serve the mass
market ([24]). Moreover, on average, profit-driven
entrepreneurs earn higher profits but their advantage
is limited by the mechanism of the crowdfunding
campaign, and product-driven entrepreneurs earn a
significant fraction of the market. Comparing to the
Keep-it-all funding scheme we used in the baseline
model, the scheme All-or-nothing is more favorable
for product-driven entrepreneur, under which the
two type entrepreneurs earn equal market shares.
We further discuss model implications on consumer
satisfaction of the platform and find that including
more product-driven entrepreneurs, or adopting
All-or-nothing funding scheme improves overall quality
of the platform, but the effects on design popularity and
consumer welfare are subtle.

1.1. Related Literature
First, our work relates to the theoretical literature
of crowdfunding. Most of the literature emphasizes
a single firm’s problem and study its strategies
and associated consequences on consumers and
crowdfunding platforms, while ours addresses the role
of competition among entrepreneurs. For instance,
[14] studies optimal pricing and product strategy of
a single firm facing heterogeneous consumers. [23]
addresses how crowdfunding market alleviates moral
hazard problem of the entrepreneur through reduction
of demand uncertainty. [20] investigates entrepreneur’s
optimal strategies of attracting funds from venture
capital and/or crowdfunding. [10] assumes away the
entrepreneur’s moral hazard problem and characterizes
the optimal reward-based crowdfunding mechanism.
[5] discusses a single firm’s crowdfunding strategy in
a dynamic setting with the focus on firm’s learning on

consumer demand.
Second, our study relates to the literature using
spatial competition model, which considers spatial
competition
among
homogeneously
motivated
entrepreneurs (mostly profit-driven). This literature
stems from [13], arguing that, price-taking
entrepreneurs or firms compete on locations and result
in converging to the same location, while price-setting
entrepreneurs try to differentiate themselves as much
as possible so as to maximize profit. (See [24] for
a comprehensive survey.) There are recent studies
using spatial competition model to study online market
behaviors. For instance, [2] discusses how spatial
competition among video game platforms influence
platforms’ investment strategies and performance. [12]
studies the impact of spatial competition between online
cashback platforms on cashback rate of the market and
consumers’ choices.
Third, our study relates to the literature discussing
non-pecuniary motivations of individuals.
A
large literature on entrepreneurship documents
entrepreneurs’ non-pecuniary motivations. (See [15] for
a comprehensive survey.) In the meantime, researchers
in many fields study the effects of individuals’
non-pecuniary motivations on their behaviors and
associated outcomes (e.g., [1], [4], [7] and [8]).
Moreover, our paper relates to a theoretical literature
of advertising and signaling, which investigates whether
firms can use advertising as signals of product quality
(See [3] for a comprehensive survey). For instance,
[16] presents a model where firms as competitive price
takers use advertisements to signal quality and find that
advertisement alone is not informative about quality,
i.e., non-existence of a separating equilibrium. [18]
establishes the existence of separating equilibrium in an
alternative setting where a monopoly firm jointly use
advertising and price to serve as signals of quality. Thus,
in these models, advertisement alone is not informative
about quality and the most desirable equilibrium
(by consumers) is the separating equilibrium, where
advertisement and/or price are informative about quality
of the product. By contrast, our model introduces
heterogeneity in motivation and allows for competition
among entrepreneurs, so that design alone is informative
about quality.
In the meantime, uninformative
equilibrium (pooling equilibrium) can be more desirable
by consumers as well as the platform—the overall
quality of the products sold on the platform is highest
under pooling equilibrium comparing to that under
separating or hybrid equilibrium.
Finally, our paper relates to a growing literature
about signaling behavior of online market. For instance,
[25] finds that firms use online branding strategies
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as signals of quality. [19] shows that small online
retailers issue warranties in order to signal the quality
of products. [9] studies whether adding charitable
donations to eBay auctions can provide an informative
signal about product quality.

2.

The Model

Consider a reward-based crowdfunding campaign
with two entrepreneurs and a unit mass of consumers.
Entrepreneurs produce the same kind of products but
with heterogeneous features. They post features of their
products on a crowdfunding platform to attract investors.
Here, we focus on the competitive product market such
as the market of video games.1 Thus, entrepreneurs on a
crowdfunding platform do not have the market power to
set product price, and so take the market price as given.
Entrepreneur e ∈ {A, B} cares about funding size,
product design and quality. Entrepreneur e has an ideal
design. We assume that the two entrepreneurs’ ideal
designs are symmetric. That is, entrepreneur A’s design
is −d, and entrepreneur B’s design is d, where d ∈
[0, 1].2 The ideal design could be broadly explained.
In practice, some crowdfunding entrepreneurs initially
generate their ideas when they were consumers and
then launch a crowdfunding campaign with their favorite
designs. Besides, entrepreneurs may have a specialty
in producing products with certain designs, so it is
less costly for them to make products with their ideal
designs.
Moreover, each entrepreneur e has a random type
te ∈ {0, T } (T > 0), which measures how she values
her ideal product over profit. We call an entrepreneur
profit-driven if te = 0 and product-driven if te =
T . The type is private information and the prior
probability of te = 0 is λ ∈ [0, 1]. Here, we set
the (relatively) profit-driven entrepreneur’s type to be
0 for simplicity, and the results hold qualitatively if
we allow the profit-driven type to be greater than 0
and smaller than T . Moreover, T can be any arbitrary
positive number. As T increases, the product-driven
entrepreneur cares more about the product. The utility
of the entrepreneurs e is
[
]
ue (x, q; de , te ) = −te (de − xe )2 + (1 − qe )2 +
pse (x) − γqe2 , (1)
1 For instance, most of the video games launched on Kickstarter or
Indiegogo are base price around $ 25 to $30. The commonly adopted
price for the traditional video game industry is around $ 30 ([26]).
2 The assumption of symmetry makes the computationally hard
problem solvable through dimensionality reduction. In the meantime,
it gives us a clean environment so that we can focus on the competition
of entrepreneurs with heterogeneous motivations without ignoring the
tension from the spatial competition. Relaxing the assumption would
complicate the computation of the equilibrium (which can only be
solved numerically) and may not bring extra insights.

where xe ∈ [−1, 1] is e’s product design, and x =
(xA , xB ); ∑
te is e’s type; se ∈ [0, 1] is e’s share of
fund, and e∈{A,B} se = 1; and p is the unit price of
the product as an investment. Throughout, we assume
xA ≤ 0 ≤ xB without loss of generality. The quality
of entrepreneur e’s product is represented by qe ∈
[0, 1], and q = (qA , qB ). Thus (1 − qe )2 represents
entrepreneur e’s disutility from producing low-quality
products.
The marginal development cost of improving
product quality is γ, and the cost of delivering qe quality
product is γqe2 . The marginal development cost does not
vary with the number of products but does increase with
the product quality. In reality, we can think about it as
the cost of adopting new production technology or the
cost of improving managerial practice to conduct better
quality control.
Consumers value both design and quality of the
product, and each consumer c decides to invest one
unit of investment in Entrepreneur A or B. We
slightly abuse notation by writing consumer c’s ideal
design as c, which is uniformly distributed in [−1, 1].
Suppose consumer c invests in a product whose
realized characteristics are represented by (x̂, q̂), then
the
of the consumer
is uc (x̂, q̂; c) = Ic −
[ utility
]
(c − x̂)2 + (1 − q̂)2 − p, where Ic > 5 + p (so that uc
is always positive). Here IC measures the consumer c’
desirability of the product. If consumer do not invest in
either platform, she receives zero utility. This implicitly
assumes consumer will always prefer investing to not
investing, which simplifies our analysis. Relaxing this
assumption will not affect the qualitative nature of our
results.
The timeline of the game is as follows.
1. Nature randomly chooses each entrepreneur’s
type te , and entrepreneurs observe their types.
2. Each entrepreneur announces her product design
x on the crowdfunding platform.
3. Consumers observe the designs and decide
whether to invest.
4. Each entrepreneur gets funded. Entrepreneur e
chooses the quality of product qe and pays the cost
γqe2 to develop the product; otherwise, they exit
the market.
5. Products are delivered to consumers, and quality
q is realized.
The game we have described is essentially a
signaling game, which has two senders (entrepreneurs)
and multiple receivers (consumers). The solution
concept here is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, where
the entrepreneurs and consumers optimize their utilities
at every history given the beliefs. Beliefs are derived
by Bayes’ rule whenever possible. For analytical
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simplicity, we restrict attention to symmetric equilibria.3
Besides, we assume consumers do not use weakly
dominated strategies, and they only invest for the
entrepreneur that maximize their expected utility.
Consumers do not observe entrepreneurs’ types
and so product quality when they make investment
decisions. However, the information carried by the
description of the product design can help them to
draw inferences about the type (and in turn the product
quality). That is, the announced design may be able to
serve as a signal of product quality.
The consumers’ posterior belief that the entrepreneur
e is profit-driven, given observing design x, is µe (x).
Write µ = (µA (xA ), µB (xB )). Taking entrepreneurs’
equilibrium design x∗ as given, the expected utility of
consumer c investing in e’s product is
Ete [uc (x∗e ; c)|µe (x∗e )] = Ic − p
]}
{
[
− (c − x)2 + Ete (1 − q̂)2 |µe (x∗e ) .
Each consumer c forms a posterior belief and makes a
binary decision of investing in A or B by comparing
the associated expected utilities. In equilibrium, all
consumers’ decisions can be summarized by the market
share of entrepreneur B, s(x∗ ). The market share of
entrepreneur A is simply 1 − s(x∗ ).
Entrepreneur e’s strategy can be written as re =
(xet , qet )∀t∈{0,T } , and we denote ret = (xet , qet )
for t ∈ {0, T }. Taking all consumers’ strategies,
and the opponent entrepreneur −e’s announced design
x∗−e (t−e ) as given, entrepreneur e’s strategy ret =
(xet , qet ) maximizes his expected utility at each
information set:
[
]
Et−e ue (xet ,x∗−e ,qet ;d,t) = pEt−e [se (xet ,x∗−e )]
[
]
2
− t (d − xet )2 + (1 − qet )2 + −γqet
.

2.1. The Crowdfunding Platform

welfare.
We define the overall product quality of the platform
by the average quality of all funded products in
∗
∗
+ s(x∗ )qBt
].
equilibrium: Q̄ = 12 E[(1 − s(x∗ ))qAt
Consumer’s feedback of the overall product quality of
the platform is critical for attracting future customers,
since the quality of each product is private information
of the entrepreneur when she announces the product on
the crowdfunding platform.
We define design popularity of a platform by
aggregating all consumers preference on designs of
the funded products in equilibrium: Ux = Ic −
]
[∫
∫
1
∗ 2
∗ 2
dc
+
−(c
−
x
dc
, where
E
−(c
−
x
)
)
At
Bt
2
CB
CA
CA (respectively, CB ) represents the set of consumers
that invest in entrepreneur A (respectively, B). Design
popularity measures how consumers are satisfied with
the design of the product, which has a great impact on
the platform’s market reputation. Converging designs
would benefit the consumers who prefer median designs
most while overlooking those who prefer the extreme.
Over diversified designs, on the contrary, would benefit
those prefer the extreme but overlook those prefer the
median.
Finally, we combine consumer’s preference
on quality and design and study consumers’
overall experience measured by consumer welfare.
In particular,
we define consumer welfare
by the total utility of all consumers: W =
]
[∫
∫
1
∗
∗
∗
∗
2 E CA uc (xAt ,qAt ;c)dc + CB uc (xBt ,qBt ;c)dc .

3.

Equilibrium Analysis

We start our equilibrium analysis by analyzing the
special case where all entrepreneurs are profit-driven.
Then we turn to characterize equilibria of the general
case and compare the predictions.

The revenue of most crowdfunding platforms comes
from platform fee, transaction fee, or service charge.
Besides, many crowdfunding platforms can get more
investment from institutional investors if they show a
sustainable market growth.4 Therefore, a large part of a
crowdfunding platform’s revenue would rely on a stable
and growing customer base, and thus we assume the
platform’s objective is to to maintain a stable customer
base through improving the customer satisfaction. In
particular, we measure consumer satisfaction from three
aspects—overall quality, design diversity, and consumer

3.1.

3 In our setting, a symmetric equilibrium is an equilibrium such that
the entrepreneur’s equilibrium action satisfies following condition:
∗ (x), q ∗ ) = (σ ∗ (x), q ∗ ), for e ∈ {A, B} and t ∈ {0, T }.
(σet
et
t
t
4 https://www.4thway.co.uk/candid-opinion/zopa-review/

We now turn to characterize the equilibria of the
baseline model. For the rest of the paper, unless
specified, we consider λ ∈ (0,1), i.e., entrepreneurs

Benchmark: Profit-driven Entrepreneurs

When entrepreneurs are both profit-driven, i.e.,
λ = 1, our model has the same prediction as in the
literature of spatial competition models: Price-taking
entrepreneurs choose the same design–the ideal design
of the median consumer.
This is because that
profit-driven entrepreneurs cater towards the median
when they are price takers. ([24]).

3.2.

Equilibrium Characterization
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are heterogeneously motivated. Since the environment
is symmetric, our analysis will focus on entrepreneur
B’s equilibrium strategy, and entrepreneur A plays a
symmetry strategy accordingly.
We solve equilibrium backwards and start with
backing out the entrepreneur’s choice of quality.
Consumers aim to infer entrepreneurs’ types so as to
predict quality. Inferring one’s type is confound and
determined through the strategic interactions among
players. But predicting product quality given one’s type
is clear and described by following Lemma.
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, the product quality of type
t entrepreneur B (if that entrepreneur succeeds the
t
∗
= t+γ
.
crowdfunding campaign) is qB
By Lemma 1, in any equilibrium, we have
q0∗ = 0, and qT∗ = T T+γ for both entrepreneurs.
For ease of notation, let q ∗ = (q0∗ ,qT∗ ).
This
lemma implies a simple yet important property of the
equilibrium—product quality is increasing in one’s type.
As a consequence, ceteris paribus, consumers prefer
products from entrepreneurs that are product-driven.
Next, we turn to the entrepreneur’s decision on
design. Since profit-driven entrepreneurs are less
concerned about the design, they are more willing
to compromise on design for profit, which results
in a (weakly) greater expected market share and
expected revenue. In the meanwhile, product-driven
entrepreneurs would choose designs that are closer to
the ideal ones. Lemma 2 formally states this property.
Lemma 2. In any equilibrium, the following statements
hold: (i) Product-driven entrepreneurs choose product
design located weakly closer to their own ideal design,
i.e., |x∗B0 − d| ≥ |x∗BT − d|. (ii) Profit-driven
entrepreneurs earn weakly greater market shares
ex-ante. That is, EtA [s(x∗B0 ,x∗At )] ≥ EtA [s(x∗BT ,x∗At )].
In general, there are many equilibria in our
game, since Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium allows for
arbitrary off-equilibrium-path beliefs. To restrict the
off-equilibrium-path beliefs in a reasonable way, we
characterize equilibrium under the requirement of
Condition D1. The idea is as follows. If type t
entrepreneur benefits more from a deviation than type
t′ , then after observing the deviation, consumers would
think that type t′ is less likely to be the deviator, and
Condition D1 pushes the logic to the limit, so that,
consumers would assign probability zero to type t′ . The
concept of Condition D1 is originated from [6].
The rest of this section characterizes the equilibrium
under Condition D1.
By Lemma 1, consumers
prefer product-driven entrepreneurs ceteris paribus due
to quality concern, which creates an incentive for
entrepreneurs to separate and mimic: Product-driven

entrepreneurs wish to separate from profit-driven
entrepreneurs and signal their types to consumers,
whereas profit-driven entrepreneurs seek to mimic
product-driven entrepreneurs and hide their types from
consumers.
First, if the entrepreneurs’ ideal design is close
to the median design 0, the median consumer may
prefer to buy a high-quality product which locates at
entrepreneur’s ideal design rather than a low-quality
product which locates at the median. In this case, a
profit-driven entrepreneur would have an incentive to
mimic the product-driven type to hide his type from
consumers. Meanwhile, a product-driven entrepreneur
cannot separate the profit-driven type even if she sticks
to her own ideal design.
Second, if the ideal design is far from 0, so that
median consumer would rather choose the product with
median design and low quality than the product with
relatively extreme design and high quality. Since
profit-driven type cares only about market share, she
would no longer mimic the product-driven type; instead,
she would pick the design at the median 0 which
gives him the highest market share. In this case,
product-driven type separates from the profit-driven
type, moving towards her ideal design.
Third, if the ideal design is in (d1 ,d2 ) or (−d2 ,−d1 ),
the median consumer may be indifferent between the
product with median design and low quality, and the
product with relatively extreme design and high quality.
In this case, product-driven type chooses her ideal
design, while profit-driven type adopts a mixed strategy:
either mimicking the product-driven or and deviating
to the median design. Theorem 1 summerizes the
equilibrium:
Theorem 1. There exists an equilibrium for all d ∈
∗
∗
[0,1]. In any equilibrium, where qe0
= 0, and qeT
=
T
for
all
e
.
Equilibrium
designs
depend
on
where
T +γ
entrepreneurs’ ideal designs locate:

i) Pooling equilibrium: If d ∈ [0,d1 ], −x∗At =
x∗Bt = d, for all t ∈ {0,T }.
ii) Separating equilibrium: If d ∈ [d2 ,1], x∗A0 =
x∗B0 = 0, and −x∗AT = x∗BT ∈ [d2 ,d). Moreover,
x∗eT for each e is unique if T <

λd22
4d3

or T >

In particular, −x∗AT = x∗BT = d2 if T <

1
4d2 .
λd22
4d3 ;

and −x∗AT = x∗BT > d2 if d > d2 + 1−λ
8T .
iii) Hybrid equilibrium: If d ∈ (d1 ,d2 ), −x∗AT =
x∗BT = d, x∗A0 = x∗B0 = 0 with probability σ ∗
and −x∗A0 = x∗B0 = d with probability 1 − σ ∗ .
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3.3. Alternative Funding Scheme
So far, the model implicitly assumes that the
crowdfunding platform adopts the Keep-it-all
(henceforth, KIA) funding scheme, i.e., entrepreneurs
keep the raised fund unconditionally. In practice, some
crowdfunding platforms such as Indiegogo use this
scheme. Meanwhile, other platforms such as Kickstarter
use the scheme of All-or-nothing (henceforth, AON),
which allows entrepreneurs to keep the raised fund only
if the funding goal has been reached. Now instead,
we consider the AON scheme and assume the funding
goal is p2 . That is, the entrepreneur can keep the fund
only if she obtains a half share of the market. Then
we compare how consumer satisfaction varies across
different funding schemes. The AON funding scheme
effectively increases competition among entreprenurs.
When funding goal is p2 , it is the case where “winner
takes all”, which gives entrepreneurs more incentive to
occupy the market.5
In this case, the model remains the same except the
entrepreneurs’ utility, which now changes to
[
]
ue (x,q;de ,te ) = −te (de − xe )2 + (1 − qe )2 +
1se ≥1/2 pse (x) − γqe2 ,
where 1se ≥1/2 is a dummy variable which equals 1 if
and only if se ≥ 1/2.
Following the same logic of the analysis in Section
3.2, we obtain the equilibrium predictions as follows.
Corollary 1. There exists a unique equilibrium for all
∗
∗
d ∈ [0,1]. In any equilibrium, where qe0
= 0, and qeT
=
T
for
all
e
.
Equilibrium
designs
depend
on
where
T +γ

entrepreneurs’ ideal designs locate: i) If d ∈ [0,d1 ],
−x∗At = x∗Bt = d, for all t. ii) If d ∈ (d1 ,d2 ),
−x∗AT = x∗BT = d, x∗A0 = x∗B0 = 0 with probability
σ ∗ and −x∗A0 = x∗B0 = d with probability 1 − σ ∗ . iii) If
d ∈ [d2 ,1], x∗A0 = x∗B0 = 0, and −x∗AT = x∗BT = d2 .
Under this AON scheme, the entrepreneur has to
win at least half of the market to get funded. Then the
product-driven entrepreneur faces a tighter constraint of
moving toward ideal design. Had she move too close to
the ideal design, she might lose the median consumer
so that the entire funding. As a consequence, she
chooses the design d2 that makes the median consumer
indifferent between profit-driven and product-driven
entrepreneurs in equilibrium so that she earns half of
the market. Recall that, under KIA scheme, she would
choose design x∗T ≥ d2 that maximizes her expected
utility by considering the tradeoff of profit vs. product
5 The assumption of “winner takes all” also gives us tractability
of the model. Relaxing this assumption to allowing for any arbitrary
funding goal, would complicate the computation but would not
provide extra insights.

unconditionally. Therefore she chooses a design closer
to the median and earns a weakly higher market share
under the AON scheme than that under the KIA scheme.

4.
4.1.

Model Implications
Entrepreneurs’ Behavior

Design Diversification. In the benchmark, competition
among homogenous types of entrepreneurs drives
them to the converging designs catering towards
the median consumer. As crowdfunding campaign
attracts heterogeneous types of entrepreneurs, the
latter may be able to convey information about their
products (including privately known quality) through
announcements of product designs.
Accordingly,
consumers make inferences from entrepreneurs’ actions
and choose products based on announced designs
and inferred quality.
In response to consumers’
demand for high-quality products as well as preferred
designs, entrepreneurs are deliberately mimicking or
differentiating from others, which results in design
diversification: Profit-driven entrepreneurs target more
towards the mass market, whereas product-driven
entrepreneurs tend to serve the niche market.
Profit of Entrepreneurs. Which kinds of entrepreneurs
earn higher market shares and/or higher profits? In
general, profit-driven entrepreneurs focus more on
attracting consumers rather than sticking to their own
ideal designs and improving quality. Thus, on average,
profit-driven entrepreneurs obtain (weakly) larger
customer base. As consumers become sophisticated on
forming beliefs about the preferences of varying kinds of
entrepreneurs, product-driven entrepreneurs attract half
of the market share when information is not revealed,
i.e., d < d1 . Otherwise, they earn a smaller size of the
market than the profit-driven ones.
Meanwhile, profit-driven entrepreneurs are less
willing to pay effort to improve product quality. Indeed,
in equilibrium, they produce low-quality products and
incur less cost in production. As a consequence,
they expect higher profits than those product-driven
entrepreneurs. Proposition 1 summarizes the results of
entrepreneurs’ expected profit.
Proposition 1. Write πt and πt† for the expected profit
of type t ∈ {0,T } entrepreneur in equilibrium under
KIA and AON scheme respectively. The following
statements hold true: (i) πT is decreasing in λ and d,
whereas π0 is increasing in λ and d; (ii) πT† is strictly

decreasing in γ and strictly increasing in T , whereas π0†
is strictly increasing in γ and strictly decreasing in T ;
(iii) π0 > πT , and s∗0 ≥ s∗T (the inequality is strict when
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d > d1 ); (iv) π0† > πT† , whereas s∗0 = s∗T .
First, under KIA scheme, how entrepreneurs’ profit
vary across T or γ is ambiguous: High devotions in
products or low marginal development costs reduce
production costs while decrease revenue. Nonetheless,
the expected profit of a product-driven (respectively,
profit-driven) entrepreneur is decreasing (respectively,
increasing) in the fraction of profit-driven entrepreneurs
and her ideal design.
Under the AON scheme,
product-driven
entrepreneurs earn higher profits; they earn the
same share of the market as the profit-driven ones.
In this case, high devotions in products or low
marginal development costs increase product-driven
entrepreneurs’ profits, which are weakly higher than
that in KIA scheme.

4.2. Crowdfunding Platform Design
We discuss implications for platform design from
two aspects: (i) How can we improve the level of
consumer satisfaction from the platform’s perspective?
(ii) How does consumers’ feedback vary across different
funding schemes? We further investigate the measures
of consumer satisfaction across different funding
schemes (KIA and AON).
Overall Quality. Whom should the platform include
in the crowdfunding platform from the perspective of
product quality? Proposition 2 answers the question.
First, on average, products appear to be of high
quality under pooling equilibrium under both schemes,
i.e., when d ∈ [0,d1 ]. Second, under each of the
funding schemes, the overall quality is decreasing in
the fraction of profit-driven entrepreneurs and marginal
development cost while increasing in the extent of the
entrepreneur’s devotion of the product. Finally, the
overall quality under AON scheme is weakly higher than
that under KIA scheme.
Proposition 2. Write Q̄p , Q̄s and Q̄h for overall
quality under KIA funding scheme in pooling
equilibrium, separating equilibrium and hybrid
equilibrium respectively; write Q̄p† , Q̄s† and Q̄h†
for overall quality under the AON funding scheme
in pooling equilibrium, separating equilibrium and
hybrid equilibrium respectively. The overall quality
Q̄ and Q̄† of the platform have following properties:
i) Q̄p > Q̄h > Q̄s ; ii) Q̄ and Q̄† are strictly decreasing
in λ and γ , weakly decreasing in d, while strictly
increasing in T ; iii) Q̄p† = Q̄p , Q̄s† ≥ Q̄s and
Q̄h† ≥ Q̄h .
Not surprisingly, to improve overall product quality
on the platform, we should include more product-driven
entrepreneurs, especially if they have higher devotion in

products (i.e., T is high). Yet interestingly, we want
all the entrepreneurs to end up with announcing the
same design so that no information about quality is
revealed through the design announcements. Therefore,
to improve overall quality, we could include more
product-driven entrepreneurs whose ideal designs are
not too far away from the median.
Another effective way of improving product
quality is by helping entrepreneurs reduce marginal
development cost (γ). For instance, the platform can
subsidize technology adoption and provide consultant
service for improving the managerial practice of
production.
Moreover, adopting the AON scheme weakly
improves overall quality. On the one hand, under
pooling equilibrium and d ≤ d1 , the overall quality is
still the highest and does not depend on whether the
funding scheme is AON or KIA. But on the other hand,
if d > d1 , adopting the AON scheme increases the
overall quality of the platform.
Design Popularity. Proposition 3 discusses how design
popularity varies across marginal development cost,
entrepreneurs’ devotion to products, and the fraction of
profit-driven entrepreneurs.
Proposition 3. Write Ux† for design popularity under
AON scheme. The design popularity under KIA and
AON scheme Ux and Ux† have the following properties:
i) Ux and Ux† is independent of γ , T and λ when d < d1 ,
and it is increasing in γ and decreasing in T when
d ∈ [d1 ,d2 ]; ii) Ux† is decreasing in λ when d > d2 ;
iii) Ux† = Ux when d ∈ [0,d2 ].
It’s less clear, from the perspective of design
popularity, whether the platform should include more
product-driven entrepreneurs, or how entrepreneurs’
ideal designs affect consumer satisfaction. In pooling
equilibrium (i.e., d ∈ [0,d1 ]), the most popular pair
of designs among all consumers is ±min{d1 ,1/2}. At
the very least, the platform would not want to include
entrepreneurs whose ideal designs are very close to
the median. But beyond that, the result is ambiguous,
especially under the KIA scheme. Under the AON
scheme, when d > d2 , design popularity increases when
we include more product-driven entrepreneurs.
On the other hand, when d ∈ [d1 ,d2 ], reducing
marginal development costs or including entrepreneurs
with higher devotions in products decreases design
popularity. In contrast, doing so will benefit the
platform from the perspective of overall quality. Finally,
whether adopting AON can improve design diversity
is ambiguous, unlike in the case of overall quality, it
potentially has a negative impact on the platform from
the perspective of design popularity.
Consumer Welfare. In pooling equilibrium, consumer
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welfare reaches its maximum at d =min{d1 ,1/2}. This
is consistent with the results of overall quality and
design popularity: Fixing d ∈ [0,d1 ], the overall quality
is independent of d, and design diversity reaches its
maximum at d = min{d1 ,1/2}. Consumer welfare
is increasing in qT∗ , and thus it is decreasing in γ.
This is because, under pooling equilibrium, the overall
quality is decreasing in γ whereas design popularity is
independent of γ.
In separating equilibrium, the relationship between
consumer welfare and marginal development cost is
more ambiguous. Reducing marginal development
cost increases overall quality, but decreases design
popularity. Thus, how it affects consumer welfare
depends on which effect dominates the other. Under
hybrid equilibrium, consistent with the case of
design popularity, the relationship between consumer
welfare and entrepreneurs’ ideal designs are not clear.
Moreover, since marginal development cost has opposite
effects on overall quality and design popularity, its
impact on consumer welfare is ambiguous. Proposition
4 summarize the results of consumer welfare.
Proposition 4. Write W † for consumer welfare under
funding scheme AON. i) W and W † is decreasing in γ
and λ and increasing in T when d ∈ [0,d1 ]; ii) W = W †
when d ∈ [0,d2 ].

we acknowledge the limitation of the analysis. First,
we assume the competition only come from the two
firms, which cannot capture the whole reality. We
think duopolistic competition is an important step and
can help us to understand the effect of competition
on entrepreneurs and crowdfunding platform, though it
cannot capture the whole reality. For instance, it is less
convenient to discuss the effect of different degree of
competitiveness.
Moreover, we assume that each entrepreneur is
of either profit-driven or product-driven type. We
use the binary types to capture the heterogeneity of
entrepreneurs’ motivations, while, in reality, there may
be many more or even continuous types.
Finally, we assume that the platform earns profit
from its stable customer base so that their main objective
is to improve consumer satisfaction. We acknowledge
that platforms can have other objectives and, believe that
what we study is the first step and hope to explore the
consequence of other objectives in future research.
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A.

Proofs of Main Theorems

Proof of Lemma 2.
Consider an equilibrium with strategy profile r = (rA ,rB ), where re =
{(xet ,qet )}t∈{0,T } for e ∈ {A,B} We now focus on entrepreneur B’s
strategy, and entrepreneur A plays a symmetric strategy in equilibrium. The
expected utility of entrepreneur B of type t entrepreneur is

[
]
∗
∗
∗
2
∗
2
∗
∗2
EtA [uB (x∗
+ EtA [s(x∗
Bt ,xAt ,qBt ;d,t)] = − t (d − xBt ) + (1 − qBt )
Bt ,xAt )] − γq Bt .

In any equilibrium, the following must hold:
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
EtA [uB (x∗
B0 ,xAt ,qB0 ;d,0)] ≥ EtA [uB (xBT ,xAt ,qBT ;d,0)],
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
EtA [uB (x∗
BT ,xAt ,qBT ;d,T )] ≥ EtA [uB (xB0 ,xAt ,qB0 ;d,T )],

or equivalently

]
[
∗
∗
∗
∗
2
∗
2
0 ≤ EtA [s(x∗
B0 ,xAt )] − EtA [s(xBT ,xAt )] ≤ T (d − xB0 ) − (d − xBT ) .

(2)
∗
∗
∗
∗
It further implies EtA [s(x∗
BT ,xAt )] ≥ EtA [s(xB0 ,xAt )] and |xB0 −
d| ≥ |x∗
BT − d|.
Proof of Theorem 1 (i) pooling equilibrium.
We show this in two steps. First, we show the strategy profile r ∗ =
(−d,−d,q ∗ ;d,d,q ∗ ), is an equilibrium if and only if d ∈ [0,d1 ]. Next,
we show, for e ∈ {A,B}, there does not exist a pooling equilibrium with
xet ̸= d. Then we establish the desired results. Since the equilibrium is
∗
symmetric, for simplicity, we fix rA
= (−d,−d,q ∗ ), and only consider
entrepreneur B’s problem.
Step 1: Suppose the strategy profile r ∗ is an equilibrium. Apparently, in
equilibrium EtA [s(d,(−d,−d))] = 12 , and µA (−d) = µB (d) = λ. As a result, the
expected utility of type t entrepreneur B is
∗2
∗
∗
∗
2
∗
∗
1
qBt
= qT
where
.
EtA [uB (x∗
Bt ,xA ,qBt ;d,t)] = −t[(1 − qBt ) ] + 2 − γqBt ,
Now suppose instead type t entrepreneur B
deviates to
′
∗
By Condition D1, for any deviation
rBt
= (x′ ,qT
) where x′ ̸= d.
∗ )2 ]
(1−λ)[1−(1−qT
d−x′
1
EtA [s(x′ ,x∗
−
.
x′ ̸= d, µB (x′ ) = 1.
Thus
A )] = 2 +
4
4(d+x′ )
Then, the expected utility of type t entrepreneur B deviating to x′ is
[
]
∗
′ 2
∗ 2
∗2
EtA [uB (x′ ,x∗
+ EtA [s(x′ ,x∗
A ,qBt ;d,t)] = −t (d − x ) + (1 − qT )
A )] − γqT .

For
r∗
to
be
∗
∗
EtA [uB (x∗
Bt ,xA ,qBt ;d,t)]

equivalently, −t(d − x′ )2 +

an
≥
d−x′
4

t ∈ {0,T }. This holds if and only if

equilibrium,
we
must
have
∗
EtA [uB (x′ ,x∗
or
A ,qBt ;d,t)],
−

∗ )2 ]
(1−λ)[1−(1−qT
4(d+x′ )

d−x′
4

−

≤ 0, for all

∗ )2 ]
(1−λ)[1−(1−qT
4(d+x′ )

≤ 0.

If x′ > d, the above holds vacuously. Otherwise, it holds if and only if
∗ 2
′
d2 − x′ 2 ≤ (1 −
√λ)[1 − (1 − qT ) ].∗ Since x ∈ [0,1], the above is
)2 ] ≥ d.
equivalent to d1 ≡ (1 − λ)[1 − (1 − qT
Step 2: Now we show r ∗ is the unique pooling equilibrium. Suppose not,
∗
;x∗∗ ,x∗∗ ,q ∗ ), where
then there exists a pooling equilibrium r ∗∗ = (rA
x∗∗ ̸= d. Towards contradiction, we show there is aways a profitable deviation
for type T entrepreneur B.
′
∗
Consider a deviation rBt
= (x′ ,qT
), where (d−x′ )2 = (d−x∗ )2 −ε
and ε → 0. Then

∗
∗
∗∗ ∗
∗
EtA [uB (x∗
,xA ,qBt
;d,t)]
Bt ,xA ,qBt ;d,t)] − EtA [uB (x

′ ∗
= −t[(d − x∗ )2 − (d − x′ )2 ] + EtA [s(x∗∗ ,x∗
A )] − EtA [s(x ,xA )]

′ ∗
= −tε + EtA [s(x∗∗ ,x∗
A )] − EtA [s(x ,xA )] < 0

The last inequality is established as follows. By Condition D1, µB (x′ ) =
0, and thus µB (x′ ) ≤ µB (x∗∗ ) = λ. Therefore, by EtA [s(x∗∗ ,x∗
A )] is
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decreasing in µB (x∗∗ ), we have EtA [s(x∗∗ ,x∗A )] − EtA [s(x′ ,x∗A )] ≤ 0.
Proof of Theorem 1 (ii) separating equilibrium. We first show, d ≥ d2 is a
necessary condition for the existence of separating equilibrium. Next we show
under that condition, a separating equilibrium does exist. Finally, we discuss the
condition for uniqueness.
Step 1: Suppose there is a separating equilibrium r∗ = (−x∗0 ,−x∗T ,q∗ ;x∗0 ,x∗T ,q∗ ).
Then by the proof of Lemma 2, Condition (2) must hold in equilibrium. Lemma
∗
2 also suggests x∗
0 ≤ xT , and thus by definition of separating equilibrium, we
∗
∗
have x∗
0 < xT . Moreover, in any separating equilibrium, x0 = 0. This is
because in any separating equilibrium, µB (x∗
0 ) = 1 and thus fixing type T
entrepreneur B’s strategy, the expected utility of type 0 entrepreneur B is:
∗
∗
EtA [uB (x∗
B0 ,xA ,qB0 ;d,0) =

1
2

+

∗
λx∗
0 +(1−λ)xT
4

−

∗ )2 ]
(1−λ)[1−(1−qT
.
∗
4[λx∗
0 +(1−λ)xT ]

(3)

Therefore, the optimal design for type 0 entrepreneur B is x∗
0 = 0. (By the fact
)
∗ )2
1−(1−qT
x∗
d2 2
∗
∗
∗
∗
T
that x∗
= 14 x∗
.
T − x∗
4x∗
0 = 0, we have EtA [s(xB0 ,xA )] − EtA [s(xBT ,xA )] = 4 −
T
T
Substituting the above into Condition (2), we obtain the equilibrium
conditions for any separating equilibrium:
(
0≤

1
4

x∗
T −

d2 2
x∗
T

)

2
≤ T [d2 − (d − x∗
T ) ].

The left inequality implies x∗
T

(4)
∗
(xT ,qT
)

≥ d2 . Note that, the strategy rBT =
∗
for any xT > d is dominated by (d,qT
) as all else equal, moving to the
right of B’s ideal design would decrease the market share and incur more loss
from ideal design. As a result, in equilibrium x∗
T ≤ d and, in turn, we have
d ≥ x∗
T ≥ d2 .
Step 2: In this step, we show when d ∈ [d2 ,1], there exists a separating
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
equilibrium. That is, there exists a x∗
T such that r = (0,−xT ,q ;0,xT ,q )
satisfy
Condition
(4);
and
(ii)
Type
is an equilibrium. If so, then (i) x∗
T
′
T entrepreneur B has no incentive to deviation from x∗
̸= 0
T to any x
given consumers’ off equilibrium path beliefs µB (x′ ) under the requirement
of Condition D1.
Denote the set of x∗
T that satisfy Condition (4) as Xse , then Xse ⊆
[d2 ,d]. By Condition D1, if consumers observe any deviation x′ ∈ Xse , then
µB (x′ ) = 0, i.e., the consumers believe the deviator to be of type T with
probability one. This is because it is less profitable for type 0 entrepreneur B
′
deviating from x∗
0 = 0 to any x ∈ Xse than type T entrepreneur B. As a
result, it would not change consumers’ belief of entrepreneur B if she deviates
′
∗
∗
′
from x∗
T to any x ∈ Xse . Therefore, taking rA and rB0 and µB (x ) as
given, x∗
solves
the
following
optimization
problem
T
′ ∗
∗
(5)
x∗
T ∈ argmaxx′ ∈Xse EtA [uB (x ,xA ,qBT ;d,T )].
∗
∗
We define the set of such x∗
T by XT . In what follows, we show XT is
nonempty. First, we show there exists some xT satisfy Condition (4), i.e,
xT ∈ [d2 ,d] and T [d2 − (d − xT )2 ] −
left hand side by F (xT ):

xT
4

F (xT ) = T [d2 − (d − xT )2 ] −

+

xT
4

∗ )2
1−(1−qT
4xT

≥ 0. Define the

∗ )2
1−(1−qT
4xT

(6)
.
Note that F (d2 ) = T [d − (d − d2 ) ] − + = T [d − (d − d2 )2 ] ≥ 0. Therefore,
d2 ∈ Xse , and so Xse is nonempty. Moreover, if d > d2 , then F (d2 ) > 0,
and by continuity of F (·), there exists [d2 ,d2 + ε] ⊆ Xse . Notice that
Xse ⊆ [d2 ,d], so Xse is bounded, and it is also closed as it is determined
by a system of weak inequalities. Thus Xse is a compact set. We now turn to
Condition (5). Rearrange terms of
Condition (5):
{
}
∗ )2
′
1−(1−qT
(7)
xT ∈ argmaxx′ ∈Xse −T (d − x′ )2 − x4 + λ
.
4x′
2

2

d2
4

d2
4

+

2

′

′ 2

(1−σ ∗ )λ

entrepreneur B is µB (0) = 1 and µB (d) = 1−σ∗ λ . Notice that if type 0
entrepreneur is willing to randomize between xB0 = 0 and xB0 = d, it must
be that she is indifferent between xB0 = 0 and xB0 = d. The expected utility
of type 0 entrepreneur B choosing
x = 0 is
[
]
1−λ
∗ 2
σ ∗ λ 21 + (1 − σ ∗ λ) 12 + d
(11)
4 − 4d(1−σ ∗ λ) (1 − (1 − qT ) ) ,
and the expected[ utility of type 0 entrepreneur B choosing
x
=
d
is
]
1−λ
∗ 2
∗
1
(12)
σ ∗ λ 21 − d
4 + 4d(1−σ ∗ λ) (1 − (1 − qT ) ) + (1 − σ λ) 2 .
Equalize
By
σ =

x′
4

λd2

(9)
T < 4d32 ,
there is a unique equilibrium where x0 = 0, and xT = d2 . Notice that
Condition (9) implies G′′ (d) > 0. Since G′′ (x) is decreasing in x, we have
G′′ (x) > 0 for all x < d, and thus G(·) is convex, i.e. G′′ (x) > 0, for
x ∈ [d2 ,d].Moreover, G′ (d) < 0 implies G′ (x) < 0 for x ∈ [d2 ,d] as
G′′ (x) > 0. Then G(x) reaches its unique maximum at d2 , and by F (d2 ) ≥
∗
0, XT
is a singleton. Thus, there is a unique symmetric separating equilibrium
where B’s strategy is (0,d2 ,0,qT ). Then we show when
(10)
T > 4d1 ,
2
there is a unique equilibrium with xT ∈ [d2 ,d). Notice that Condition (10)
implies F ′′ (d2 ) < 0. Since F ′′ (x) is decreasing in x, F ′′ (x) < 0 for all
x > d2 , and thus F (·) is concave, i.e. F ′′ (x) < 0, for x ∈ [d2 ,d]. By
G′′ (x) < F ′′ (x), we also have G′′ (x) < 0 for x ∈ [d2 ,d]. Finally, by
F (d2 ) > 0 and F ′ (d) < 0, it must be either F (x) cross 0 once before
ˆ and dˆ is
d or F (x) ≥ 0 for x ∈ [d2 ,d]. Thus Xse = [d2 ,min{d,d}],
determined by F (x) = 0 for x ∈ [d2 ,∞). So Xse must be convex, and
together with strict concavity of G(·), there is a unique solution to the problem
∗
described in Condition 7. As a result, XT
is a singleton, and this completes the
proof.
Proof of Theorem 1 (iii) hybrid equilibrium. Theorem 1 (i-ii) show that there
is no separating or pooling equilibrium for d ∈ (d1 ,d2 ). We now show there
is a unique hybrid equilibrium. First by Condition D1, we have x∗
BT = d
in hybrid equilibrium. When type t entrepreneur separates from type 0, any
strategy with xBT = x∗ ̸= d is dominated by the strategy with xBT = x′
and all else equal, where x′ is ε closer to d, i.e., (x′ − d)2 − ε = (x∗ − d)2
where ε → 0. Choosing a design closer to his ideal design further makes type
T entrepreneur better off from product preference; this makes µB (x′ ) = 0,
and thus increases market share.
Moreover, by Equation (3), type 0 entrepreneur B would only assign
positive probability to x = x∗
T and/or xB0 = 0 in equilibrium. All else equal,
suppose type 0 entrepreneur B chooses design x′ ̸= x∗
T , then xB0 = 0
maximizes type 0 entrepreneur B’s expected utility, i.e. Equation (3). As a
result, type 0 entrepreneur B would only assign zero probability on any xBT ̸=
0 or x∗
T . Consequently, if there exists a hybrid equilibrium, we can write
the equilibrium as σ = (σ ∗ (0,−d),−d,q ∗ ;σ ∗ (0,d),d,q ∗ ), where σ(0,d)
(respectively, σ(0,−d)) represents the probability the entrepreneur assign to 0,
and thus 1 − σ(0,d) (respectively, 1 − σ(0,−d)) represents the probability
the entrepreneur assign to d (respectively, −d). By symmetry, in equilibrium,
σ ∗ (0,d) = σ ∗ (0,−d). For ease, write σ ∗ = σ ∗ (0,d) = σ ∗ (0,−d).
Next, we show there exists σ ∗ ∈ (0,1) such that σ is an equilibrium.
Suppose σ ∗ is an equilibrium. Then by Bayes rule, consumers’ posterior about

∗

Define the objective function by G(x ):
′

First, we show when

Equation

(11)

d1 < d < d2 ,
[
1
λ

1 − (1 −

it

]
2

d
λ) d22

<

1
λ [1

and
is

Equation

easy

to

(12)
check

σ∗ =

1
λ

σ∗ =

[
1−

∗ )2 )
(1−λ)(1−(1−qT
d2

[
1
λ

1−

d2
1
d2

]
> 0,

]
.

and

− (1 − λ)] = 1.

∗ )2
1−(1−qT
λ
4x′

.
(8)
+
G(x ) = −T (d − x ) −
Since G(·) is continous and Xse is compact, by Weierstrass Theorem there
must exists a solution to the optimization problem defined by Condition (7). That
λd2

∗
∗
is, XT
is nonempty. In addition, XT
⊆ [d2 ,d) since G′ (d) = − 14 − 4d22 <
0.
Step 3: Whether there is a unique separating equilibrium is determined
by if there is a unique solution of the optimization problem defined by
Condition (7), which is determined by the properties of the objective function
function G(·) and the domain Xse = {x ∈ [d2 ,d]|F (x) ≥ 0}. The first
order and second order derivatives of functions F (·) and G(·) are as
2
2
d2
2 , F ′′ (x) = −2T + d2 , G′ (x) = 2T (d − x) − 1 − λd2 , and
follows: F ′ (x) = 2T (d − x) − 14 − 4x
2
4
2x3
4x2
λd2
G′′ (x) = −2T + 2x32 . Thus, in general, the concavity of G(·) and the convexity of the
set Xse are not determined. As a consequence, separating equilibrium may not
be unique. We now discuss under what conditions we have a unique separating
equilibrium.
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